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COMMENT

Sovereign Wealth Funds and Shareholder
Democratization: A New Variable in the
CFIUS Balancing Act
GEORGE S. EVERLY III†
_______________________

I. INTRODUCTION
Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) are emerging as a critical source
of liquidity in the global economy. As government surpluses grow,
SWFs act as conduits by which these surpluses are invested abroad to
create a significant return on investment for the sponsoring country.
However, governments do not always welcome foreign investment
within their country. In the United States, for example, increasing
foreign investment from SWFs has rekindled a debate over the
tradeoff between the positive economic benefits of capital inflows
and the national security concerns that accompany such investments.
This debate is fueled by the fact that many of the fastest growing
SWFs are sponsored by governments that are politically at odds with
the United States. In the past, this has led to protectionism, which
tends to create political responses disproportionate to the actual risks
posed by SWFs. However, state sponsored foreign investment does
provide a method by which foreign governments can gain influence
† Senior Editor, Maryland Journal of International Law 2009–10; J.D.,
University of Maryland School of Law, M.B.A., Robert H. Smith School of
Business, May 2010.
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over a domestic corporation and exert political pressure on the
management, directors, and shareholders. This creates a valid
national security concern that deserves a measured, rational response.
In the United States, the Treasury Department tasked the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) with
identifying and reviewing investments from overseas that trigger
national security concerns based on the possibility that they are
politically motivated.1 CFIUS recently released new regulations and
guidelines meant to provide more certainty and clarity in its review
process.2 To that end, CFIUS clarified an exception to its review
process which carves out passive investments that constitute ten
percent or less of a target company’s equity.3 More specifically, an
equity stake equal to or less than the ten percent threshold with pro
rata voting rights automatically falls under this exception to CFIUS
review.4 However, shareholder activism is demonstrating that such a
stake can create an excessive amount of influence and power while
still falling short of the type of control that CFIUS is targeting.
As SWFs increase their level of investment, shareholders of U.S.
companies are using new methods to gain influence and control over
corporate affairs. For instance, hedge funds are finding creative ways
to influence board decisions by leveraging significant ownership
interests in target companies. The Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) has also introduced a number of proposed rules
that seek to enhance shareholder democratization. Even shareholders
have been effective in changing a number of corporate governance
rules in their favor. Examined alongside CFIUS regulations, this
movement towards increased shareholder rights and influence may
exacerbate national security concerns in situations where SWFs have
gained a significant equity stake in a corporation.
Global economic organizations are addressing this issue through
multilateral agreements rather than unilateral regulations like CFIUS.
Many of the countries that sponsor the largest SWFs have joined the
International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth Funds (IWG) to
1. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
2. See Regulations Pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers by
Foreign Persons, 31 C.F.R. § 800 (2008).
3. Id. § 800.302(b).
4. Regulations Pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers by Foreign
Persons, 73 Fed. Reg. 70702, at 70710 (Nov. 21, 2008) [hereinafter Merger
Regulations].
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help publish accepted governance principles and best practices. For
countries in which SWFs are actively investing (Recipient
Countries), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) has published investment policy guidelines as
part of its Freedom of Investment initiative. On the other hand,
neither of these groups has established an enforcement mechanism
for their best practices or policy guidelines.
Ultimately, national security concerns posed by politically
motivated SWFs are being exacerbated by shareholder activism while
simultaneously being offset by the activities of regulatory agencies
like CFIUS and the development of international standards for
governance and transparency within these state-owned funds. Many
commentators believe that CFIUS has so far struck a proper balance
between economic benefits and national security concerns.5 The issue
is whether these developing movements will act as appropriate
counterbalances, cancelling each other out and maintaining that
proper equilibrium within the preexisting regulatory framework of
Recipient Countries.
II. SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS
SWFs “are special purpose investment funds or arrangements that
are owned by the . . . government.”6 Due to the 2008 boom in
commodity prices and an accumulation of foreign reserves, 7 the
holdings controlled by SWFs have grown to the point that the funds
are now cornerstones of the global economy that facilitate the free
flow of a significant amount of capital around the world.8 A recent
study by Deutsche Bank found that the top ten SWFs control roughly
three trillion USD, which amounts to eighty-five percent of total
SWF assets worldwide.9 Furthermore, total assets under the control of
5. See, e.g., George Stephanov Georgiev, The Reformed CFIUS Regulatory
Framework: Mediating Between Continued Openness to Foreign Investment and
National Security, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 125 (2008).
6. INTERNATIONAL WORKING GROUP OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS,
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS: GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES 3
(2008) [hereinafter SWF INT’L WORKING GROUP], http://www.iwgswf.org/pubs/eng/santiagoprinciples.pdf.
7. Tom Lauricella & Anne Davis, Commodity Prices Surge as More Investors
Seek Haven, WALL ST. J., Feb. 29, 2008, at A1.
8. Vidhi Chhaochharia & Luc Laeven, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Their
Investment Strategies and Performance 12 (Centre for Econ. Policy Research,
Discussion Paper No. 6959, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1308030.
9. STEFFEN KERN, SWFS AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT POLICIES - AN UPDATE 5
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SWFs are expected to grow to ten trillion USD by 2015.10
The recent growth of SWFs reflects a redistribution of wealth in
favor of emerging economies.11 Most of these funds are used by
countries as a method to invest budget surpluses created through
commodity exports, currency exchange activities, or other methods.
Many state-sponsored funds throughout the world vary with respect
to the size of assets under control, source of funding, degree of
separation between the sponsoring government, transparency and
disclosures, and asset allocation.12
Historically, these funds have invested in riskless assets and debt
instruments, such as U.S. Treasury Bonds and other low-yield bonds.
However, many SWFs are now seeking higher rates of return by
targeting riskier assets such as equity stakes in publicly traded
companies, indirect holdings through hedge funds and other financial
intermediaries, and private equity.13 While the financial crisis caused
widespread losses among SWFs holding these riskier investments,
the largest funds have already signaled they are ready to begin
searching for new investments due to depressed asset prices. 14 The
power and influence associated with these types of investments have
caught the attention of the governments of Recipient Countries.
These governments are now closely examining the benefits and risks
associated with foreign investment by SWFs in search of possible
responses.
Various economic benefits are associated with foreign equity
investment. Most critically, SWFs allow governments with budget
surpluses to boost the amount of capital available in global equity
markets by diversifying billions of dollars across publicly traded

(Deutsche Bank Research, Oct. 2008), http://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR_
INTERNET_EN-PROD/PROD0000000000232851.pdf.
10. Id. at 6.
11. Edwin M. Truman, Policy Brief: A Blueprint for Sovereign Wealth Fund
Best Practices 3 (Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ. Policy Brief No. PB08-3, Apr.
2008), http://www.petersoninstitute.org/publications/pb/pb08-3.pdf.
12. Ronald Gilson, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Corporate Governance: A
Minimalist Response to the New Mercantilism, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1354–59
(2008).
13. Gerard Lyons, State Capitalism: The Rise of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 14 L.
& BUS. REV. AM. 179, 179 (2007).
14. Jason Dean & Lui Li, Feeling Flush, China’s CIC Opens Wallet, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 31, 2009, at C1.
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companies.15 Given tightening credit markets, these macroeconomic
implications provide a significant incentive for governments to
embrace state-controlled foreign investment.16 SWFs may also invest
directly in certain sectors where capital and liquidity may be needed.
For example, equity investment by SWFs in the depressed U.S.
financial sector, directed towards banks such as Citigroup and
Morgan Stanley, boosted liquidity and abated short-term market
volatility17 in the same way that the U.S. federal government bailout
of the banking sector attempted to do.18 Governments that inhibit
foreign investment risk damaging their economies and putting their
countries at a competitive disadvantage compared to those
governments that encourage the free flow of capital across national
boundaries.
On the other hand, links between a fund and the sponsoring state’s
political establishment raise concerns that the motive to invest will be
political rather than commercial. While each fund may maintain a
different degree of independence from the sponsoring country’s
government, SWFs are nevertheless ultimately funded by and under
the direct control of a foreign state. China in particular has shown a
proclivity for mixing politics and business, especially when a
precious commodity is at stake. When a contractual dispute arose
between the Chinese government and Rio Tinto, an Australian
mining company, over benchmark iron ore prices, Chinese authorities
arrested some of Rio’s employees in response.19 Shareholders of that
company also turned down a takeover bid by Aluminum Corp. of
China, a state-owned company, due to concerns that the Chinese
government would use Rio to supply China with cheap iron ore. 20
Similarly, China used an investment in Fortesque, another Australian
mining company, to secure a three percent discount on the
benchmark price of imported iron ore.21 These examples show that
15. Gilson, supra note 12, at 1360.
16. Id.
17. Fariborz Moshirian, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Sub-Prime Credit
Problems 16, Table 3 (Sept. 29, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1275226.
18. Deborah Solomon, U.S. to Buy Stakes in Nation’s Largest Banks, WALL ST.
J., Oct. 14, 2008, at A1.
19. China and the Rio Tinto Detentions: The Steel Fist of Government,
ECONOMIST, July 18, 2009, at 60.
20. Shai Oster, China’s Iron-Ore Discount Hinges on Granting Loans, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 18, 2009, at A10.
21. Id.
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China is willing to employ its growing financial resources and
strategically invest in target companies to accomplish political
goals.22
This concern over political investment is compounded by a
noticeable lack of transparency in key aspects of many funds’
management profiles. Many SWFs do not disclose their investment
objectives, assets and holdings, governance structure, or
performance.23 As a result, Recipient Countries are often left with
very little knowledge or understanding of SWFs and their
motivations.
III. REGULATIONS AND AGREEMENTS AFFECTING SOVEREIGN
WEALTH FUNDS
A. Domestic Regulations Affecting SWFs
The United States has put into place a patchwork of regulations
that apply to some of the investments made by SWFs. These
regulations govern securities generally, transactions in certain
industries, and foreign investment specifically.
1. General Securities Regulations
Many of the regulations affecting U.S. securities generally are
aimed at increasing disclosure and transparency rather than
prohibiting control. For example, under the Williams Act, an investor
or entity is required to disclose the number of shares beneficially
owned, percent of share ownership, and voting power when it owns
more than five percent of a registered class of shares. 24 Further, if the
intent of the purchase is to change or influence the control of the
issuing company, then the acquiring entity must disclose the purpose
of the acquisition, source of investment funds, number of shares it
owns, voting power, and any material contracts or arrangements with
respect to the securities.25 This greater disclosure is made to the SEC,
22. The U.S. Government appears to have noticed this trend as well. A Chinese
government-owned company recently decided to withdraw its bid for a Nevada
gold mining company after CFIUS suggested it would intervene and block the
transaction due to national security concerns. Eric Lipton, Chinese Withdraw Offer
for Nevada Gold Concern, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2009, at B3.
23. Amy D. Keller, Sovereign Wealth Funds Trustworthy Investors or Vehicles
of Strategic Ambition?, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 333, 342 (2009).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2002) (amending Securities Exchange Act of 1934);
Exchange Act Rules, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (2007).
25. Exchange Act Rules, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1 (2007).
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the issuing company, and the exchange on which the securities are
traded.26 In addition, Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act
requires a shareholder with a beneficial ownership of more than ten
percent to disclose to the SEC the amount of its holding and to notify
the SEC when there is a transaction that affects ownership of this
share.27
2. Transactions Affecting National Security
In 1988, Congress passed the Exon-Florio Amendment,28 which
amended the Defense Production Act of 1950 in response to the
increasing number of acquisitions of U.S. assets by Japanese
companies.29 Exon-Florio allows the President to block certain
transactions to prevent foreign acquisition of U.S. companies in
industries critical to national security.30 The clause granting this
power uses broad language that allows the executive branch
significant discretion when determining what transactions to
investigate.31 With the Byrd Amendment of 1993,32 Congress
specifically ordered the executive branch to review transactions
involving a foreign government-controlled acquirer that affect the
national security of the United States.33 Congress recently overhauled
the Exon-Florio Amendment with the passage of the Foreign
Investment and National Security Act of 2007 (FINSA).34 This Act
sets out the most current framework by which foreign acquisitions
and investments within the U.S. are reviewed, including equity
investments by SWFs.
The President’s powers under the Exon-Florio Amendments are
delegated to CFIUS, an inter-agency body composed of the heads of
various agencies.35 Currently, any CFIUS member may unilaterally
26. Id.
27. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(a), Pub. L. No. 291, § 1, 48 Stat. 881,
896.
28. Defense Production Act of 1950 § 721, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (1988).
29. Georgiev, supra note 5, at 126–27 (2008).
30. Jonathan C. Scagg, Scrutinizing Foreign Investment: How Much
Congressional Involvement Is Too Much?, 93 IOWA L. REV. 325, 335 (2007).
31. Id. at 338.
32. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 (Byrd
Amendment), Pub. L. No. 102–484, § 837, 106 Stat. 2463, 2463–65 (1992).
33. Id. § 837(a)(2).
34. Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-49,
121 Stat. 246 (2007).
35. The twelve present members of CFIUS include:
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trigger the review process upon suspicion that the transaction might
affect national security.36 This rarely occurs though, as companies are
encouraged to voluntarily provide notice of a pending transaction. If
voluntary notice is given and no action is taken, CFIUS will not
subsequently reverse this decision and review the transaction,37
meaning that the regulations create a safe harbor that rewards foreign
companies that voluntarily notify CFIUS of a proposed transaction.
CFIUS has the authority to review only “covered transactions,”
defined as any transaction “by or with a foreign person and [that]
could result in control by a foreign person of a U.S. person or persons
engaged in interstate commerce in the United States.”38 The
regulations further state that “[t]he term control means the power,
direct or indirect, whether or not exercised, . . . to determine, direct,
or decide important matters affecting an entity.”39 This broad
definition of “control” allows CFIUS wide discretion in determining
whether a transaction meets the required “covered transaction”
threshold.
However, to create certainty for foreign investors, the regulations
provide that a transaction is not covered if it results in a foreign
person holding ten percent or less of the outstanding voting interest in
a U.S. business, but only if the transaction is solely for the purpose of
passive investment.40 At first glance, “solely for the purpose of
passive investment” seems to be a provision that allows CFIUS broad
discretion to review any transaction it wishes. Indeed, the word
“passive” was implemented in the most recent rule changes made by
CFIUS in response to calls from Congress to address a perceived
loophole.41 However, in its accompanying discussion, CFIUS states
the Secretaries of State, the Treasury, Defense, Homeland Security, and
Commerce; the U.S. Trade Representative; the Chair of the Council of
Economic Advisers; the Attorney General; the Directors of the Office of
Management and Budget and of the Office of Science and Technology
Policy; the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; and the
Assistant to the President for Economic Policy.
Georgiev, supra note 5, at 127. For a more complete history of CFIUS, see Scagg,
supra note 30.
36. Georgiev, supra note 5, at 127.
37. Id.
38. 31 C.F.R. § 800.501(a)(1) (2008).
39. Id. § 800.204.
40. Id. § 800.302(d)(1).
41. See Implications of Sovereign Wealth Fund Investments for National
Security: Hearing Before the U.S. - China Economic and Security Review
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that a passive investment only includes an ownership stake less than
ten percent with the ability to vote those shares pro rata.42 Thus, if an
SWF acquires an equity stake with pro rata voting rights that
comprises ten percent or less of ownership in a U.S. company, the
transaction would not qualify as a “covered transaction” and
therefore would fall outside of the purview of CFIUS. As later
discussion shows, equity stakes of this nature may fall short of
providing absolute control of a domestic entity to a foreign investor,
but they do allow a significant amount of influence over target
entities.43
B. International Organizations Provide Voluntary Guidelines to
Regulate SWFs
Many industrialized countries have in place a review process
similar to that of the U.S.44 However, many of these same countries
are now encouraging a multilateral approach to the difficult questions
posed by SWFs. Backed by the U.S., European Union, and others, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have set out to
establish a best practices guide for both SWFs and countries
receiving investment from SWFs.
1. Best Practices for SWFs
In response to the growing importance of SWFs, the IMF helped to
establish the International Working Group of Sovereign Wealth
Funds (IWG).45 This group, consisting of twenty-six SWFs created by
member countries of the IMF, sought to develop a list of voluntary
best practices to be adopted by SWFs worldwide. The IWG produced
the Generally Accepted Principles and Practices for Sovereign
Wealth Funds (GAPP),46 consisting of twenty-six principles based on
a survey completed by its members.47 GAPP acts as “a framework of
Commission, 110th Cong. Sess. 2 (2008) (statement of Sen. Jim Webb) [hereinafter
Sen. Jim Webb Hearing Statement].
42. Merger Regulations, supra note 4, at 70710.
43. See infra Part IV.
44. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-320, FOREIGN
INVESTMENT: LAWS AND POLICIES REGULATING FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN 10
COUNTRIES (2008), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08320.pdf.
45. SWF INT’L WORKING GROUP, supra note 6, at 1.
46. GAPP is also referred to as the Santiago Principles.
47. CORNELIA HAMMER, PETER KUNZEL & IVA PETROVA, SOVEREIGN WEALTH
FUNDS: CURRENT INSTITUTIONAL AND OPERATIONAL PRACTICES (Sept. 2008),
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generally accepted principles and practices that properly reflect
appropriate governance and accountability arrangements as well as
the conduct of investment practices by SWFs on a prudent and sound
basis.”48 GAPP addresses three main underlying characteristics of
SWFs: (1) legal framework, objectives, and coordination with
macroeconomic policy, (2) institutional framework and governance
structure, and (3) investment and risk management framework.49
The first two characteristics focus on creating a governance
structure that encourages the separation of political and commercial
interests of a fund.50 Politically motivated investment is the crux of
national security concerns under regimes such as CFIUS. Recipient
Countries would rather see a mandated fund structure that requires
commercial interests to take precedence over political interests.
However, GAPP does not lay out a specific structure to be instituted
by every SWF. Instead, the guidelines outline the broad goals that
such a structure would seek to accomplish.51 The underlying rationale
is that the structure needs to be adapted to the size, objectives, and
roles of the SWF, as well as the regulatory regimes within which it is
investing.52 The downside to this approach is that much of the
discretion is left to the SWF, which may not be as interested in
accomplishing the same goals as the Recipient Country.
Furthermore, as stated above, compliance with GAPP is
completely voluntary and the IWF does not plan to develop an
enforcement mechanism.53 Instead, the IWG hopes to establish a
standing group of SWFs, which will assist funds with the practical
matters of implementing GAPP.54 The standing group will
periodically review the principles so that they accurately reflect
modern best practices. However, it remains to be seen how effective
peer pressure within the international community will be in
accomplishing widespread adherence to GAPP among countries
http://www.iwg-swf.org/pubs/eng/swfsurvey.pdf.
48. SWF INT’L WORKING GROUP, supra note 6, at 4.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 5.
51. Paul Rose, Sovereigns as Shareholders, 87 N.C. L. REV. 83, 138 (2008).
52. Id.
53. DELOITTE TOUCHE TOHMATSU, MINDING THE GAPP: SOVEREIGN WEALTH,
TRANSPARENCY, AND THE “SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES” 15 (2008) [hereinafter MINDING
THE GAPP], https://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/
Documents/us_dtt_fs_mindtheGAPP_111108(1).pdf
54. SWF INT’L WORKING GROUP, supra note 6, at 6.
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hosting SWFs.
While GAPP provides a signal of multilateral cooperation and
support for unified action toward the emergence of SWFs, it also
represents a negotiated compromise. The principles explicitly address
concerns over politically motivated investments, but they are less
ambitious concerning public disclosure and transparency.55 Some
SWFs stand as examples of transparency and good governance,56 but
others have objected to greater public disclosure for a variety of
reasons, including privacy and competitive advantage.57 For example,
the heads of both the China Investment Corporation and the Kuwait
Investment Authority have publicly stated that increased transparency
will compromise their first-mover advantage and inflate asset prices
before they can establish their fund’s position.58 However, the
regulatory systems of many western countries are built upon
transparency and disclosure, and many governments have objected to
the idea of inviting nontransparent investors to invest, at their
discretion, large sums of money into the marketplace on the basis of
market stability and investor protection.59 Still, the international
community has tried to prevent these sorts of reactions by also
developing a set of guidelines that countries should follow in
response to receiving investments by SWFs.
2. Principle Guidelines for Recipient Countries
The OECD has released a best practices guide for Recipient
Countries, which will supplement the work done by the IWG.60 There
are four underlying philosophies that drive these guidelines in regard
55. MINDING THE GAPP, supra note 53, at 14.
56. CalPERS, in the U.S., and the Norwegian Oil Fund are generally held up as
examples of SWFs that demonstrate these characteristics. See Delia Velculescu,
Norway’s Oil Fund Shows the Way for Wealth Funds, IMF SURVEY MAGAZINE,
July 9, 2008, at 110, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/20
08/073108.pdf.
57. See Interview by Lesley Stahl with Gao Xiqing, head of China’s new SWF,
on 60 Minutes CBS television broadcast (Apr. 6, 2008), available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/04/04/60minutes/main3993933.shtml.
58. Rose, supra note 51, at 141.
59. Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Gauer
Distinguished Lecture in Law and Policy at the American Enterprise Institute Legal
Center for the Public Interest: The Rise of Sovereign Business (Dec. 5, 2007)
(transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch120507cc.htm).
60. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. [OECD], SOVEREIGN WEALTH
FUNDS AND RECIPIENT COUNTRY POLICIES 2 (Apr. 2008) [hereinafter OECD SWF
REPORT], http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/34/9/40408735.pdf.
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to national security.61 First, Recipient Countries should avoid
discrimination by treating similarly situated investors in a consistent
manner through generally applied principles.62 When general
principles are not adequate to address national security concerns, the
restrictive measures should be tailored to the specific investment
causing concern and not to all investments from a particular
country.63 Second, regulations that govern foreign investment should
be made as transparent as required confidentiality will allow so that
they create predictable outcomes and encourage investment.64 This
includes publication and codification of applicable regulations,
notification of changes in investment policy, procedural certainty and
predictability, and disclosure of policy actions to reinforce
government accountability.65 Third, the level of restrictions that
regulations place on certain investments should be proportional to the
national security risk posed by those investments.66 Finally,
procedures for high-level government oversight should exist in order
to create accountability in the implementing agency. 67 This includes
accountability to citizens of the country as well as to the international
community. Accountability should also allow some sort of recourse
through efficient administrative mechanisms when a Recipient
Country takes action against a foreign SWF.68
The principles promulgated by the IWG and the OECD are
founded upon the solid ideals of free, fair, and transparent financial
markets. For purposes of this discussion, the CFIUS review process
satisfies most, if not all, of the OECD Recipient Country
Guidelines.69 The greater concern is that the IWG guidelines for
SWFs lack an enforcement mechanism needed to protect market
participants lacking financial leverage or market information. Thus,
these guidelines will most likely serve as a strong basis for future
action in this area, but they do not ultimately protect Recipient
Countries from politically motivated investments. This is especially
noteworthy when viewed in conjunction with the increasing ability of
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
OECD SWF REPORT, supra note 60, at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Georgiev, supra note 5, at 134.
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shareholders of U.S. companies to affect corporate affairs.
IV. SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM
Currently, shareholders in publicly traded U.S. companies are
gaining more power and influence over the board of directors and
thus, indirectly, over management.70 Many contend that this trend
towards shareholder democratization will blur the separate, wellestablished spheres of management and shareholder rights.71
Historically, the rise of institutional investors, such as mutual funds
and pension funds, was widely expected to have the same result but
generally failed to live up to expectations.72 However, proposed
regulations, changes in corporate governance aimed at increasing
shareholder power within the corporation, and the success of
aggressive hedge funds promise to push the trend towards corporate
democratization to new levels.73
A. Proposed Changes in Regulations
The SEC recently reviewed new rules that would increase
shareholders’ influence over management. For example, the oftendebated proxy access rule would allow shareholders to add their
choices of candidates for the board of directors.74 Currently, a board
has exclusive discretion in choosing candidates to fill board seats
under Rule 14a-8 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.75
Commentators believe that changing this rule is critical to
empowering shareholders.76 The SEC also considered rules that
would effectively allow shareholders with a five percent stake in a

70. Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duty for Activist Shareholders, 60
STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1275 (2008).
71. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Investor Activism: Reshaping the Playing
Field? (May 2008) (UCLA School of Law, Research Paper No. 08-12), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1130969.
72. Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 70, at 1278.
73. Id. at 1307–08.
74. Lisa M. Fairfax, Making the Corporation Safe for Shareholder Democracy,
69 OHIO ST. L.J. 53, 72 (2008).
75. Rule 14a–8(i)(8) allows a company to omit any shareholder proposal
relating to the election or related procedure from the proxy materials. Press
Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Votes to Codify Longstanding Policy on
Shareholder Proposals on Election Procedures (Nov. 28, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-246.htm.
76. See Lisa M. Fairfax, The Future of Shareholder Democracy, 84 IND. L.J.
1259 (2009).
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company to use corporate funds to pay for proxy contests.77 Access to
corporate funds is one of the incumbent board’s most potent weapons
against proxy fights, as it requires activists to spend significant
personal resources. The SEC also reviewed rules that would eliminate
“broker voting.”78 Current rules now allow brokers to vote their
client’s shares on routine matters of the corporation, including
director elections. Because brokers consistently vote with
management, this provides a sizeable chunk of shares in the
incumbent’s favor. If the proposal is successful in removing director
elections from the definition of routine matters, incumbents would
almost certainly face more pressure from challengers.
While proposed rules favoring shareholder participation in
corporate governance have suffered a number of set backs in the past,
the financial crisis has made these changes much more politically
attractive.79 For instance, Chairman Schapiro recently gave a speech
strongly supporting the proposed changes.80 Congress also introduced
a bill that would provide shareholders with a right to include their
own director nominees in proxy statements.81 The intense debate
taking place over corporate governance, within both the SEC and the
corporate community, signals a broader movement towards
challenging the status quo and increasing shareholder involvement in
corporate affairs.
B. Shareholder Influence over Corporate Governance Rules
Shareholder activists have used their growing voice to champion
changes to business practices and corporate by-laws. Shareholders of
U.S. corporations have a fundamental right to vote on the election of
directors and certain extraordinary transactions, such as mergers or

77. Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 70, at 1282.
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., Jeff Nash, Broker Vote Saps Shareholder Might, FINANCIAL
WEEK, Apr. 28, 2008, http://www.financialweek.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/
20080428/REG/694771377.
80. Mary Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address to the
Transatlantic Corporate Governance Dialogue – 2009 Conference (Sept. 17, 2009)
(transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch091709mls.htm).
See also Karey Wutkowski, Lifting the Lid: SEC to Look Outside Ballot on Proxy
Access, REUTERS, Jan. 4, 2008,
http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKN1741224720080104.
81. Phred Dvorak & Kara Scannell, Investors, Take Note: New Bill to Target
Boards ‘Say on Pay’, WALL ST. J., April 25, 2009, at B2.
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dissolutions.82 Out of practical concerns for efficiency, voting may be
done by proxy. Under federal proxy rules, a proxy solicitation and
statement containing a list of proposals is sent to each shareholder,
who then casts a vote on each issue and returns the forms to the
corporation.83 Shareholders have been using their right, under federal
law,84 to add proposals to proxy statements to garner support from
other shareholders. Increasingly, shareholders are using this process
to introduce resolutions and proposals that are causing real changes to
their corporation’s governance rules.85
For instance shareholders in many corporations have proposed and
achieved majority voting of directors. Compared to plurality voting,
which is the default rule in many jurisdictions including Delaware,
majority voting increases the power of each shareholder vote 86 by
requiring a potential director to receive the majority of votes in order
to be successfully nominated to the board.87 On the other hand,
plurality voting rules only require a director to receive more votes
than other candidates.88 Thus, unlike plurality voting, majority voting
rules count withheld votes as “no votes” and make votes against a
director meaningful.89 A study of various corporate boards
demonstrates this trend, finding that sixty percent of respondents’
boards had adopted majority voting or will be considering the issue
within a year.90
Shareholders are also attacking the popular system of staggered
terms for corporate board members. Under this system, only a certain
number of board members are eligible for reelection each year. This
prevents shareholders from replacing the board during proxy fights or

82. Fairfax, supra note 74, at 59–60.
83. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (2008).
84. Id. § 240.14a-8 (2008).
85. Fairfax, supra note 74, at 68. But activist shareholders may also use their
influence to pursue personal agendas. Paula Tkac, One Proxy at a Time: Pursuing
Social Change through Shareholder Proposals, 91 FED. RES. BANK ATLANTA
ECON. REV. 1, 5 (2008).
86. See CLAUDIA H. ALLEN, STUDY OF MAJORITY VOTING IN DIRECTOR
ELECTIONS (Neal, Gerber & Eisenberg LLP, Feb. 2007), available at
http://www.ngelaw.com/files/upload/majority_callen_020707.pdf.
87. Fairfax, supra note 74, at 64.
88. Id. at 63.
89. Id. at 64.
90. THE KORN/FERRY INSTITUTE, 34TH ANNUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS STUDY
31 (2008), http://www.kornferry.com/Publication/9955.
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takeover battles.91 While proposals for majority voting rights receive
much more attention, attacks on the staggered term system have also
enjoyed widespread support among shareholders. As a result, some
corporations recently abandoned staggered terms and others may
follow.92
Under each of these corporate governance changes, shareholders
with pro rata voting rights are using their rights under federal proxy
laws to add proposals to proxy statements and attempting to bring
about changes in corporate governance. These changes are increasing
the shareholders’ control over the corporation and blurring the
previously well-defined line between shareholders and stakeholders.
With the financial crisis pushing more shareholders to participate in
shareholder meetings, activists should find it easier to win additional
measures.93 This broad movement towards corporate democratization
and increased shareholder rights is exemplified by the increasing
number and size of aggressive, activist hedge funds.
C. Hedge Funds Demonstrate New Methods of Influence
Historically, individual and institutional investors’ attempts at
activism were generally hindered by the need to diversify their
assets.94 Investors’ relatively small stakes in publicly traded
companies prevented them from seeking any real influence. Hedge
funds, on the other hand, acquire large stakes in target companies for
the purpose of becoming actively involved in their affairs.95
Diversification poses less of a problem due to the fact that investors
in hedge funds are usually wealthy and sophisticated and have
already achieved broad diversification.96
While a large stake in a target company does not provide a hedge
fund with control over that company, it does provide the fund with a
significant amount of influence. Hedge funds leverage this influence
using different techniques, such as public pressure and the threat of
proxy contests and litigation against management to change the
91. Fairfax, supra note 74, at 70.
92. Id.
93. Mark Cobley & Elizabeth Pfeuti, Shareholders Increasingly Exercise Votes,
WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Sept. 7, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1252282132
39489605.html.
94. Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 70, at 1278.
95. Id. at 1279.
96. Id.
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business’s strategy.97
An institutional shareholder owning a large equity stake can put
significant public pressure on a company’s management by
signifying dissatisfaction with current management. Such
dissatisfaction is usually followed by sale of the investor’s equity
stake rather than proactive remedies.98 In order to align shareholder
and management interests, the officers of a corporation are often paid
with common equity, stock options, and bonuses triggered by stock
performance.99 By depressing the price of the stock through the sale
of a large equity stake, the institutional investor can both lower the
market value of the company and significantly decrease the
management’s compensation.100 A 2008 study supports this theory,
finding that CEO turnover rates are higher and more new directors
are appointed at companies with activist investors.101 Other
shareholders may also be convinced to sell their stakes by the
institutional investor’s actions, compounding the detrimental effect of
the sale on the stock price. For these reasons, the directors and
management of a company tend to heed statements made by
institutional investors holding a large equity stake in their company,
even if it represents less than ten percent ownership.
For example, in 2005, a hedge fund named Third Point used public
pressure to force the resignation of the CEO of Star Gas Partner LP.102
Holding a six percent stake in the company, Third Point emphasized
its position as the largest stakeholder in a press release that criticized
a number of management blunders.103 CEO Irik Sevin stepped down
from his position shortly thereafter.104 The hedge fund did not use any
formal powers granted by corporate governance rules or rights
pursuant to a preferred ownership interest. Instead, Third Point used
97. Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance
and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1029 (2007).
98. Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional
Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L. J. 445, 462 (1991).
99. Kelli A. Alces, Strategic Governance, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 1053, 1064 (2008).
100. Id. at 1065.
101. Alon Brav, The Returns to Hedge Fund Activism 21 (ECGI Working Paper
Series in Law No. 098.2008, Mar. 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1111778.
102. Third Point Demands That Star Gas CEO, Irik Sevin, Resigns and Returns
Keys to Company Car, PR NEWSWIRE, Feb. 14, 2005, http://sev.prnewswire.com/
oil-energy/20050214/NYM31414022005-1.html.
103. Kahan & Rock, supra note 97, at 1029.
104. Id. at 1030.
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the “soft power” associated with large equity stakes, which can carry
great influence without any sort of formal legal right or power.
The ouster of Citigroup CEO Charles Prince also demonstrated the
sort of influence that an equity stake of a certain size can bestow
upon a shareholder. In November 2007, Prince Walid Bin Talal, a
wealthy Saudi investor with an investment portfolio that surpasses
most hedge funds, recommended that the CEO of Citigroup be fired.
Prince Bin Talal did not hold a seat on the board of directors, which
would have provided him with this sort of authority. Rather, he
controlled a 3.9% equity stake in the company.105 Nonetheless,
Citigroup’s board decided to heed his advice based on the “soft
power” created by the size of the Prince’s pro rata voting share.106
These strategies can effect substantial change in a target company
despite the fact that hedge funds almost never acquire a controlling
equity stake.107 Instead, one study of activist hedge funds found that
the “overwhelming majority” of funds took between a five and ten
percent pro rata ownership share, with a median of six percent.108 In
other words, hedge funds implement their activist strategies while
holding positions that would qualify as mere influence, rather than
control, under CFIUS regulations.109
V. SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM WILL INCREASE
INFLUENCE AND RISKS OF SWFS

THE

POTENTIAL

Due to the objectives given to CFIUS by Congress, as well as the
need to encourage foreign investment within the U.S., current
regulations offer few restrictions on SWFs that are sophisticated
enough to structure their investment to avoid attention. While not an
immediate concern, risks posed by excessive influence from foreign
governments will be exacerbated by the movement towards greater
shareholder rights and activism. However, CFIUS must avoid
unilateral regulation that could cause extensive damage to the
105. Sen. Jim Webb Hearing Statement, supra note 41, at 114. Prince Bin Talil
has since increased his equity holdings of Citigroup to over 5 percent of the
company. Madlen Read & Stephen Bernard, Citi Shares Sink Despite Saudi
Prince’s Investment, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 21, 2008, http://www.realclearmar
kets.com/news/ap/finance_business/2008/Nov/20/citi_shares_sink_despite_saudi_p
rince_s_investment.html.
106. Sen. Jim Webb Hearing Statement, supra note 41, at 114.
107. Brav, supra note 101, at 8.
108. Id.
109. See supra Part III.A.2.
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economy and international standing of the U.S. in the midst of an
existing economic crisis.
A. Limitations on CFIUS Review
As noted above, the newest regulations promulgated by CFIUS
carve out an exception to the committee’s jurisdiction when an
acquiring entity owns an equity stake of ten percent or less with pro
rata voting rights.110 This exception represents the committee’s policy
of concentrating on “control” rather than mere “influence.” CFIUS
makes clear that influence falling short of the definition of control
does not fall within the purview of the regulations.111
The ten percent exception is rare in the sense that the rest of the
regulations generally eschew bright-line rules in favor of broad
definitions that provide members of CFIUS with a good degree of
discretion when determining which transactions to review.112 While
CFIUS maintains that the newest promulgation of the rules blurs this
bright line standard and expands the scope of its scrutiny by adding
the term “passive” to describe exempted investments, the
accompanying guidance reaffirms a carve out for certain
investments.113 This half-measure could be a means to pacify calls
from Congress and the public relating to legitimate national security
concerns while recognizing that uncertainty in the regulatory process
might discourage foreign investment at a time when liquidity is so
badly needed.
B. Hedge Funds as Predictors
SWFs have an advantage similar to hedge funds. As stated above,
hedge funds mitigate the problems of diversification through their
sophisticated clients.114 While SWFs do seek to diversify their assets
in most cases, the sheer size of the assets under their control allows
SWFs to take significant equity stakes in even the largest publicly
traded companies while still remaining relatively diversified.115 For
example, some SWFs have invested billions of dollars into the riskladen equity of U.S. financials to take advantage of extremely
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

See supra Part III.A.2.
Merger Regulations, supra note 4, at 70704.
See supra Part III.A.2.
See supra Part III.A.2.
See supra Part IV.C.
Moshirian, supra note 17.
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depressed prices.116 However, the percentage of the SWF’s overall
assets that these investments represent is small enough that the equity
stakes do not have a material impact on the fund’s risk profile. In
other words, many of the investments made by hedge funds in target
corporations, if governed by CFIUS regulations, would fall under the
ten percent or less exception in the regulations. The size and type of
investments taken by SWFs are often similar to the size and type of
investment taken by hedge funds and institutional investors.117 Thus,
activist hedge funds show that SWFs may leverage these investments
to influence corporate affairs. As a result, foreign governments may
use their influence to effect politically motivated changes in target
corporations.
C. The Balancing Act
This risk is compounded by the fact that many of the tools that
hedge funds, and thus SWFs, can use to gain influence over
corporations are being bolstered by the general movement towards
shareholder democratization. For instance, current trends toward
proxy access and majority voting and away from staggered director
elections will only make voting rights associated with equity stakes
more influential.118 Instead of adjusting the regulations to account for
the changing landscape, CFIUS chooses to keep in place an old
framework, which was created before these significant changes in
corporate governance occurred.
As the democratization of corporate governance advances, the
potential influence and power of SWFs that hold equity stakes will
grow while, under the newest regulations, the ten percent exception
prevents CFUIS from reviewing those investments. GAPP attempts
to address the main concern of industrialized countries, namely
politically, rather than commercially, motivated investments.119 In
fact, the Treasury Department strongly supports GAPP to supplement
the regulations designed by CFIUS.120 However, this international
response, crafted by the very SWFs it seeks to govern, is careful to
use softer, nonbinding language throughout. Further, it is unclear to
116. See Liam Vaughan, SWF Investment in Financials at All Time High,
FINANCIAL NEWS, Oct. 28, 2008, http://www.efinancialnews.com/usedition/index/
content/3352315459.
117. See supra Part IV.C.
118. See supra Part IV.B.1.
119. See supra Part II.A.
120. See supra Part II.A.
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what extent GAPP will be implemented by most SWFs and there is
no foreseeable enforcement mechanism.121 These facts suggest no
change in one side of a previously balanced equation while, on the
other side, shareholder activism is materially changing in favor of
increased corporate democratization.
VI. CONCLUSION
It appears the current U.S. policy towards foreign investment by
SWFs is to wait and see whether multilateral agreements will be
strong enough to prevent politically motivated investments. To be
fair, it is unclear to what extent the IWG’s guidelines will be
accepted and implemented by the international community of SWFs.
However, this uncertainty speaks to the weakness of those
agreements as an effective check against politically motivated foreign
investment.
On the other side of the equation, the evidence cited above
provides little doubt that shareholders are seizing increasing power
throughout the U.S. The opportunities to influence and control
corporate affairs inherent in the positions taken by hedge funds can
also be expected in the positions taken by many SWFs. As a result,
CFIUS regulations leave open the possibility for foreign governments
to gain more influence and control over American businesses through
equity investment as shareholder democratization advances.

121. MINDING THE GAPP, supra note 53, at 15.

